China Anti-Monopoly Law Compliance: A Practical Guide for Foreign Companies
China's Anti-Monopoly Law was overhauled in 2022 and the vertical safe harbor was set in 2026. Here is how the three conduct categories, the resale price maintenance rules, the 5% and 15% safe harbor thresholds, and the penalties actually apply to foreign companies operating in China.

China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was adopted on 30 August 2007 and took effect on 1 August 2008. It was amended on 24 June 2022, with the amendments taking effect on 1 August 2022 — the first substantive revision in the law's history. For a foreign company with a China subsidiary, distributor network or local joint venture, the AML governs pricing, distribution, market power and deals, and the penalties are now material enough to treat compliance as a board-level issue rather than a legal footnote.
The three categories of conduct the AML regulates
The AML targets three distinct forms of conduct, and each carries a different test and a different penalty:
- Monopoly agreements — agreements, decisions or concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition. They come in horizontal form (agreements among competitors, Articles 16–17) and vertical form (agreements between operators at different levels of the supply chain, Article 18).
- Abuse of a dominant market position (Articles 22–24) — unilateral conduct by an operator with market dominance, such as below-cost sales, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing or discriminatory treatment.
- Concentrations of undertakings (Article 25 onwards) — mergers, acquisitions and joint-venture formations that meet notification thresholds and require prior clearance from the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR).
The enforcer for all three is SAMR, the State Administration for Market Regulation, which may delegate enforcement to provincial-level market regulators under Article 13. The Anti-Monopoly Commission (Article 12) is a coordinating body, not an enforcer.
Monopoly agreements: horizontal, vertical and the hub-and-spoke rule
Horizontal agreements — price-fixing, market allocation, output restriction and joint boycotts among competitors — are treated as hard-core and are generally prohibited regardless of market share. Vertical agreements, in contrast, are more nuanced.
Article 18 targets two forms of resale price maintenance (RPM): fixing the price at which a reseller may resell a product, and fixing a minimum resale price. The 2022 amendment added two important devices. Article 18(3) introduced a safe harbor in principle — an authorization for the State Council's antitrust enforcement agency to define the market-share and other conditions under which a vertical agreement is presumed not to restrict competition. Article 19 added a hub-and-spoke prohibition, aimed at a party that organizes other operators to reach a monopoly agreement or provides substantial assistance to them in doing so.
The vertical safe harbor: the 2026 thresholds you need
The safe harbor is where most foreign companies get the numbers wrong. The 2022 amendment only stated the principle; the specific thresholds came later, in an amendment to the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements that SAMR adopted on 19 December 2025 and that took effect on 1 February 2026. They are split by type of restraint:
- Vertical price restraints (RPM) — fixing resale prices or fixing a minimum resale price: each party to the agreement must have a market share below 5% in the relevant market in each year, and the products covered by the agreement must have an annual turnover below RMB 100 million. Both conditions must be met.
- Vertical non-price restraints — territorial allocation, exclusive dealing, customer restrictions and the like: a market share below 15%, with no turnover requirement.
So the common shorthand "the safe harbor is 15% market share" is only half right — and it is wrong for resale price maintenance, which faces the stricter 5% plus RMB 100 million double test. If your China distribution agreements contain pricing floors or fixed resale prices, do not assume a 15% safe harbor protects them.
Abuse of a dominant market position
Dominance is a fact-specific finding. Article 23 lists the factors — market share, competitive constraints, control over the market, financial and technical resources, dependence of other operators and barriers to entry — and Article 24 sets presumptions: one operator with 50% of a market, two with two-thirds, or three with three-quarters are presumed dominant unless proven otherwise. For a foreign company, the practical question is usually whether a policy that is routine elsewhere — exclusivity, loyalty rebates, tying, refusal to supply — becomes an abuse when the company is dominant in a narrower relevant market in China than it assumed. The relevant market definition, which Chinese authorities draw narrowly in many technology and industrial cases, is often where the case is won or lost.
Merger control: file before you close
Concentrations are subject to a prior-notification regime. Closing a notifiable transaction before clearance is "gun-jumping" and is penalized separately from the merits of the deal. The thresholds, the control test and the simple-case shortcut are covered in our dedicated guide to China merger control and antitrust filing. If the deal has a China nexus — a local target, a local joint venture or revenue in China — treat the filing analysis as a closing condition, not an afterthought.
Penalties to put in your risk register
- Monopoly agreements (Article 56): order to cease, confiscation of illegal gains, and a fine of 1%–10% of the prior year's sales. If there were no sales in the prior year, a fine of up to RMB 5 million; if the agreement has not yet been implemented, up to RMB 3 million. Individuals — the legal representative, principal responsible person or directly responsible person — can be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear personal responsibility for reaching the agreement. Industry associations that organize one face up to RMB 3 million, and in serious cases revocation of registration.
- Abuse of dominance (Article 57): order to cease, confiscation of illegal gains, and a fine of 1%–10% of the prior year's sales.
- Gun-jumping (Article 58): where the concentration has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition — an order to restore the pre-concentration state plus a fine of up to 10% of prior-year sales (an upper bound only, with no 1% floor); where it does not have such an effect, a fine of up to RMB 5 million.
- Aggravation (Article 63): in particularly serious cases, the fines under Articles 56, 57, 58 and 62 can be multiplied by two to five.
The vertical safe-harbor thresholds described here took effect on 1 February 2026 and are subject to change by SAMR. Confirm the current thresholds and the definition of the relevant market with local counsel before relying on them for a specific distribution agreement. For deal-related antitrust exposure, see China Merger Control: Antitrust Filing and Clearance.
A compliance checklist for foreign companies
- Audit vertical restraints. Find every distribution or resale clause with a fixed or minimum price, and every territorial or exclusive-dealing restriction, and test each against the correct safe-harbor threshold.
- Watch the hub-and-spoke risk. Price alignment coordinated through a common distributor, agent or platform can now be caught even without a direct competitor agreement.
- Screen deals for merger control. Build a China filing analysis into every acquisition and joint-venture checklist.
- Document the rationale. Where a restraint has a pro-competitive justification, keep the efficiency evidence at the time the agreement is made, not after an investigation begins.
The 2022 amendment and the 2026 safe-harbor rules are still being absorbed into enforcement practice. The companies that get into trouble are rarely the ones with no policy — they are the ones with a global policy applied to China without checking whether the Chinese numbers changed.

