Invest in ChinaOct 9, 2026 · 10 min readIflawyer Editorial Team · Reviewed by licensed attorneys

China Non-Compete and Confidentiality Agreements: A Guide for Foreign Employers

China non-compete and confidentiality clauses are governed by the Labor Contract Law and two SPC interpretations, with a 2025 rule that narrows who can be bound. Here is who you can bind, the 30% and 50% compensation standards, the two-year cap, and how the 2025 changes affect foreign employers.

China Non-Compete and Confidentiality Agreements: A Guide for Foreign Employers

Foreign employers in China often import a template non-compete clause from a US or European employment agreement and assume it will hold up. Chinese law treats non-compete and confidentiality as two separate obligations with different legal foundations, and it imposes conditions — on who can be bound, on how much you must pay, and on how long the restriction can last — that foreign templates routinely miss.

Confidentiality and non-compete are two different duties

The two clauses are often bundled in one agreement, but they do not depend on each other. A confidentiality obligation protects information the employee learns in the course of work and can apply broadly; a non-compete obligation restricts where the employee may work after leaving, and it costs the employer money. Under Article 23 of the Labor Contract Law, the parties may agree on a non-compete restriction and the employer must pay monthly economic compensation after the employment relationship ends. A confidentiality clause does not require that compensation; a non-compete clause does. Conflating them is the most common drafting error — and the most common reason a Chinese court or arbitrator refuses to enforce a restriction.

Who can be bound, and for how long

Article 24 of the Labor Contract Law confines non-compete obligations to three categories of people: senior management personnel, senior technical personnel, and other personnel with confidentiality obligations. The scope, territory and duration are agreed by the parties, but the duration may not exceed two years from termination. A clause that binds an entire sales team or a junior engineer without a genuine confidentiality nexus is exposed — and a 2025 interpretation has tightened this further, as we explain below.

Compensation: the 30% fallback, Shenzhen's 50% and local practice

Non-compete compensation is the single biggest source of confusion. The baseline is set by Article 36 of the Supreme People's Court's Interpretation (I) on Labor Dispute Cases (Fa Shi [2020] No. 26, effective 1 January 2021): where the parties did not agree on the amount, an employee who has performed the non-compete obligation may demand monthly compensation of 30% of their average monthly wage over the 12 months before termination — and no less than the local minimum wage if that 30% falls below it. Crucially, 30% is a fallback for cases where the parties agreed nothing, not a national statutory floor that overrides a lower agreed figure.

  • Shenzhen imposes a genuine statutory floor: under Article 24 of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Regulations on the Protection of Enterprise Technical Secrets, monthly compensation may not be less than 50% (one-half) of the employee's average monthly wage over the last 12 months before departure; where the agreement is silent or sets less, the 50% standard applies.
  • Beijing and Shanghai have no fixed 30% statutory floor. Local arbitration practice tends to accept compensation in the range of roughly 20%–60% (Beijing) and 20%–50% (Shanghai) of prior earnings, with reasonableness assessed case by case.
  • Non-statutory guidance: the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security's Compliance Guidelines for Enterprise Non-Compete Implementation (effective 12 September 2025) suggest monthly compensation generally no lower than 30% of the employee's average monthly wage for the 12 months before leaving, and no lower than 50% where the restriction runs longer than one year — administrative guidance without the force of law.

The practical lesson: if you agree a specific amount that is clearly adequate, most tribunals will respect it; if you agree nothing or agree a token amount, you face either the 30% fallback or, in Shenzhen, the 50% standard.

The 2025 change that narrows the net

On 1 September 2025, the Supreme People's Court's Interpretation (II) on Labor Dispute Cases (Fa Shi [2025] No. 12) took effect, and Articles 13–15 of it materially changed non-compete practice. There is no standalone "non-compete judicial interpretation" — the relevant rules live inside this broader labor-dispute interpretation.

  • Article 13 — actual access matters. An employee who did not actually know of or have access to the employer's trade secrets or intellectual-property confidentiality matters may ask a court to declare the non-compete clause ineffective. Where the scope, territory or duration is disproportionate to what the employee actually knew, the part exceeding a reasonable proportion is void.
  • Article 14 — during-employment restrictions. The parties may agree on a non-compete obligation that applies during the employment relationship, for senior management, senior technical personnel and other personnel with confidentiality obligations.
  • Article 15 — remedies for breach. Where an employee breaches an effective non-compete agreement, the employer may claim return of the compensation already paid and payment of the agreed liquidated damages.

In short, the 2025 rules push back on the over-use of non-competes against employees who never touched anything sensitive. A foreign employer that bound an entire department "just in case" now faces a real risk that the clause is ineffective or partially void.

Trade secrets sit under a different statute

Confidentiality obligations are reinforced by the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (amended 2019), which defines trade secrets and the acts that misappropriate them (Article 9), shifts the burden of proof in civil infringement actions once the rights holder has produced prima facie evidence (Article 32), and provides punitive damages of one to five times the damages for malicious and serious infringement (Article 17(3)). Because the 2025 interpretation ties non-compete validity to actual access to trade secrets, an employer that has not identified and marked its trade secrets in the first place will struggle to satisfy Article 13's precondition.

💡 Practical tip

The 30% and 50% figures, and the interpretation of "disproportionate" scope under Article 13, are developing in local tribunals. Confirm the current local standard — especially in Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai — before finalizing a non-compete program. For the wider employment framework, see China Employment Law: Hiring Staff for Your WFOE.

A drafting checklist for foreign employers

  • Separate the two clauses. Write confidentiality as an obligation and non-compete as a compensated restriction, each with its own scope and remedy.
  • Justify each individual. Document that each bound employee actually had access to trade secrets or confidential IP — the 2025 test — and keep that evidence on file.
  • Set a defensible compensation figure. Agree an amount clearly at or above local practice; never leave it silent and never set a nominal sum.
  • Cap the term at two years. And tie the geographic and product scope to what the employee actually knew.
  • Keep confidentiality unbounded but realistic. Confidentiality duties can survive termination, but identify the specific information rather than labeling everything secret.

Chinese non-compete law rewards precision. The employers who get enforcement are the ones who bound the right people, paid a real amount, and scoped the restriction to the secrets the employee actually held.

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This article is general information and does not constitute legal advice. For a specific transaction or dispute, consult a qualified lawyer licensed in the relevant jurisdiction.